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THE SIGN OF "THE FOUR": JUDICIAL 

ASSIGNMENT AND THE RULE OF LAW 

Jonathan L. Entin* 
On July 30, 1963, Judge Benjamin Franklin Cameron 
threw the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
into turmoil, charging Chief Judge Elbert P. Tuttle with ma­
nipulating the composition of panels in civil rights and deseg­
regation cases so as to influence their outcome. l Specifically, 
he accused his colleague Tuttle of packing panels with liberal 
judges who consistently supported the claims of civil rights 
activists. 2 The liberal jurists, whom he derisively character­
ized as "The Four," were Tuttle, Richard T. Rives, John Minor 
Wisdom, and John R. Brown.3 According to Judge Cameron, 
at least two of The Four sat in twenty-two of the twenty-five 
civil rights cases that the Fifth Circuit had heard during the 
preceding two years. 4 In the aggregate, The Four sat fifty-five 
times in these cases while the other five members of the court 
sat only twelve times. Moreover, one of The Four wrote the 
opinion in twenty-three of the twenty-five cases.5 
. Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. 
1 Armstrong v. Board of Educ., 323 F.2d 333, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1963). 
2 Armstrong, 323 F.2d at 353 n.l. 
3 [d. 
• [d. at 358. 
• [d. Cameron listed the cases and the panel membership in an appendix, 
and two weeks later added four more cases that he had previously overlooked. [d. 
at 359-61. The Four constituted at least a majority of the panel in three of those 
cases. [d. at 360-61. 
Cameron further complained that he, a Mississippian, was excluded from 
three-judge district courts in Mississippi civil rights cases despite what he charac­
terized as a previously "universal practice" in the Fifth Circuit and elsewhere of 
appointing the circuit judge resident in the state to three-judge courts. [d. at 358­
369 
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Cameron's sensational charges provoked a storm of con­
troversy.6 The suggestion of improper judicial assignment is 
always "troubling,"7 but especially under these circumstances. 
Cameron had raised the specter of case rigging in the nation's 
most sensitive field and its most volatile region: race relations 
in the Deep South. Moreover, he had done so in the aftermath 
of the violence accompanying the desegregation of the Univer­
sity of Mississippi the previous year; contempt proceedings 
against the governor and lieutenant governor for their defi­
ance in that matter were still pending in the Fifth Circuit.8 
Although Cameron's figures appear at first glance to be 
persuasive, there are several possible responses to his charge 
of manipulation. One is that his data were inaccurate in cer­
tain respects. 9 Jack Bass, a journalist who chronicled the 
work of The Four, took this approach. Bass pointed out that 
Cameron omitted several cases from his analysis and skewed 
the numbers by separately counting every phase of some cases 
(particularly the University of Mississippi dispute) that came 
before the Fifth Circuit more than once, thereby exaggerating 
the number of decisions involving The Four.lo Similarly, Bass 
found that the irate judge would have obtained less striking 
results if his study had covered a slightly longer time peri­
59. Instead, members of The Four were selected to hear these cases. Ed. 
• See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 235-40 (1981); FRANK T . READ & Lucy 
S. MCGoUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP 
SOUTH 268-72, 274-75 (1978); see also HARVEY C. COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE 
FIFTH CIRCmT, 1891-1981, 120-21 (1984). 
7 Cruz v . Abbate, 812 F .2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987). 
8 See generally READ & MCGoUGH, supra note 6, at 254-65. There is a sub­
stantial literature on the desegregation of Ole Miss. For the perspective of the 
man who broke the color line, see JAMES MEREDITH, THREE YEARS IN MISSISSIPPI 
(1966). For chronicles by faculty members, see RUSSELL H. BARRETT, INTEGRATION 
AT OLE MISS (1965), and JAMES W. SILVER, MISSISSIPPI: THE CLOSED SOCIETY 
107-40 (1964). For more recent accounts, see NADINE COHADAS, THE BAND PLAYED 
DIXIE 57-106 (1997), and DAVID G. SANSING, MAKING HASTE SLOWLY 156-95 
(1990). 
• Cameron unquestionably was wrong in one respect: Judge Brown rather 
than Chief Judge Tuttle made the assignments. READ & MCGoUGH, supra note 6, 
at 272. 
10 BASS, supra note 6, at 241 , 243-45. 
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od. ll Moreover, Bass noted, several of Cameron's cases in­
volved issues that had already been settled by the Supreme 
Court, so the composition of the panel should not have affect­
ed those results. 12 Finally, according to Bass, civil rights 
claimants actually lost several cases in which some combina­
tion of The Four constituted a majority of the panel. I3 
However, Bass's approach misses an important aspect of 
the criticism. The issue Cameron raised implicated not only 
the outcome of the cases, but the process by which the panels 
were selected. 14 From this perspective, his complaint was not 
only that panels were chosen with an eye toward influencing 
decisions, but also that assignments were not random. 15 An 
alternative explanation that responds to this concern focuses 
on the scheduling constraints arising from the preferences of 
individual judges. 16 There is some evidence for this explana­
tion. For example, Cameron himself asked not to be assigned 
to any panels that included Chief Judge Tuttle due to their 
disagreement over civil rights; another judge did not want to 
sit with Cameron because of his insistence on late afternoon 
conferences after morning arguments; and a third judge had 
serious health problems that prevented him from sitting at all 
for most of the two years covered by Cameron's study.17 Only 
11 Id. at 244. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
" See Burke Marshall, Southern Judges in the Desegregation Struggle , 95 
HARv. L. REv. 1509, 1514 (1982) (book review). 
" Armstrong v. Board of Educ., 323 F.2d 333, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1963). 
Cameron's objection to being excluded from three-judge district courts in Missis­
sippi civil rights cases in the face of a tradition of appointing the resident circuit 
judge to three-judge courts in cases arising in his state suggests that he did not 
necessarily favor strictly random assignment in every case. Armstrong, 323 F .2d 
at 358-59. 
16 READ & MCGoUGH, supra note 6, at 273. 
17 Id. Moreover, two other members of the court who had interim appoint­
ments were not assigned to civil rights cases for several months in order to avoid 
antagonizing powerful segregationists in the Senate who could have blocked their 
confirmation. [d.; see BASS, supra note 6, at 240-41; COUCH, supra note 6, at 122. 
The propriety of insulating interim judges from hostile senators in this fashion is 
beyond the scope of this article. So is the constitutionality of interim judicial ap­
pointments, although the courts have upheld this practice. See United States v. 
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three members of the Fifth Circuit-all of them part of The 
Four-were available to sit with every one of their col­
leagues. 18 Against this background, it seems reasonable that 
they would have participated in a disproportionate number of 
cases of all types. 19 There is some evidence for this hypothe­
sis, although it is far from conclusive.20 
At this point, we can say that Cameron's data provide less 
support for his provocative charge of ideologically motivated 
assignments than he seemed to believe. There are benign 
explanations for at least some of his complaints, and his study 
is hardly a model of methodological rigor. 
We shall return to Judge Cameron's charges later. Let us 
assume for now, though, that he was correct is asserting that 
judges in the Fifth Circuit's civil rights cases were not ran­
domly assigned to panels. Exactly what is wrong with that? 
This is hardly a frivolous question. The relevant federal stat­
utes do not require any particular method of judicial assign­
ment to cases. In the courts of appeals, three-judge panels are 
composed and cases are assigned "as the court directs."zl In 
Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Allocco, 305 
F.2d 704, 709-12 (2d Cir. 1962). Suffice it to say that these arrangements raise 
questions about the independence of persons exercising judicial power under Arti­
cle III of the Constitution. C{ Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1014-33 (Norris, J., dissent­
ing); Note, Recess Appointments to the Supreme Court-Constitutional But Un­
wise?, 10 STAN. L. REV. 124 (1957); Members of Faculty Question Wisdom of Earl 
Warren's Recess Appointment, HARv. L. SCH. REc., Oct. 8, 1953, at 1; Henry M. 
Hart, Jr., Letter, HARV. L. SCH. REC., Oct. 8, 1953, at 2. But the two Fifth Cir­
cuit judges were not unique. Among others who first took the bench under inter­
im appointments were Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Stewart. 
See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 257-58, 266, 272-73 (3d ed. 
1992). 
I. BASS, supra note 6, at 24l. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. From January to October 1961, a period that includes only part of 
Cameron's study, "some combination of The Four sat on 159 of the 191 nonrace 
cases heard by Fifth Circuit panels." Id. 
21 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1994). This provision directs the Federal Circuit to adopt 
"a procedure for the rotation of judges from panel to panel to ensure that all of 
the judges sit on a representative cross section of the cases heard." Id. No such 
language appears in this statute with respect to any other court of appeals. An­
other difference between the Federal Circuit and the geographically based circuits 
is that the former may sit in panels having more than three members, whereas 
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district courts containing more than one judge, cases are to be 
"divided among the judges as provided by the rules and orders 
of the court."22 And in the now infrequently constituted three­
judge district courts, the chief judge of the circuit designates 
two of the members; except for the requirement that at least 
one of these must be a circuit judge, the statute does not oth­
erwise specify how these judges are to be chosen. 23 Some 
courts have adopted rules or internal operating procedures 
governing judicial assignment, but many others (at both the 
federal and the state level) appear to have no written policy 
on the subject.24 
Nevertheless, claims of assignment manipulation clearly 
strike a raw nerve. Judges are sensitive to the appearance of 
impropriety that might be inferred from unusual assignment 
procedures.25 Moreover, the perception that judicial assign­
ments matter is supported by the continuing contentiousness 
over judicial appointments. 26 There are also well-documented 
efforts to evade customary procedures for assigning cases to 
judges. People have gone to jaiF7 and lawyers have been se­
verely disciplined2B for trying to circumvent the assignment system. 
the latter may not. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1994) . 
• 2 28 U.S.C. § 137 (1994). 
'3 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1) (1994). The third judge must be the district judge to 
whom the case, with its request for the convening of a three-judge court, was 
initially assigned. [d. 
.. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text. 
•• BASS, supra note 6, at 237-40. Many Fifth Circuit judges were apoplectic 
over Cameron's allegations, and Chief Judge Tuttle convened an emergency meet­
ing to try to clear the air. [d.; READ & MCGoUGH, supra note 6, at 269-71. Cf 
Rappaport v. VV Publ'g Corp., 637 N.Y.S.2d 109 (App. Div. 1996) (upholding dis­
missal of judge's libel suit on grounds that statements in article that judge was 
receiving disproportionate share of certain cases were not defamatory as matter of 
law). 
26 Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed concern over delays in confirming federal 
judges, a phenomenon apparently due to political differences between the White 
House and the Senate. William H. Rehnquist, The 1997 Year-End Report of the 
Federal Judiciary, THE THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1998, at 1, 3. 
27 See, e.g., United States v. August, 745 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1984); State v. 
Jurek, 556 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); State v. McCool, 544 N.E.2d 933 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988) . 
.. See, e.g., Grievance Adm'r v. August, 475 N.W.2d 256 (Mich. 1991) (suspen­
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There is a surprisingly large body of case law on judicial 
assignment. Most of that case law has arisen in lower-profile 
disputes than civil rights and desegregation. The bulk of them 
involve judicial assignment at the trial court level, although 
the analysis in those cases presumably should apply to analo­
gous situations at the appellate level. Some claims in this area 
invoke the Constitution, while others rely on various theories 
under state law or court rules and procedures. Whatever the 
basis for these claims, they rarely succeed even when the facts 
suggest that judges were assigned in non-random fashion . 
This article will examine the issues ofjudicial assignment. 
Then the article will return to the Cameron situation in an 
effort to put that controversy into broader perspective. Finally, 
the article will consider state procedures that, for practical 
purposes, authorize litigants to make peremptory challenges 
to judges in certain circumstances. Those procedures have 
implications for the discussion of random assignments and for 
the way we think about Judge Cameron's charges. 
I. THE CONSTITUTION AND JUDICIAL AsSIGNMENT 
Manipulation of judicial assignments can deprive litigants 
of their right to a fair hearing and contravene basic principles 
of due process. As the Supreme Court has put it, due process 
"clearly requires a 'fair trial in a fair tribunal.",29 However, 
the federal courts, as well as most state courts, have generally 
been unreceptive to constitutional challenges to judicial as­
signment. 
An often-cited case that rejects the argument that the 
Constitution requires random assignment is United States v. 
Keane. 3o Keane involved the prosecution of a powerful mem­
ber of the Chicago city council for mail fraud and conspira­
sion); Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Jurek, 581 N.E.2d 1356 (Ohio 1991) (disbarment); 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Melamed, 580 N.E.2d 1077 (Ohio 1991) (disbar­
ment); In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1997) ($10,000 sanction). 
29 Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1797 (1997) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 
421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975» . 
30 375 F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (N.D. Ill. 1974), affd in part and reu'd in part on 
other grounds, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975). 
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cy.31 By local rule, the district court ordinarily assigned cases 
randomly.32 In "protracted, difficult or widely publicized" cas­
es, however, the rule authorized the chief judge to bypass the 
random assignment process and, in consultation with the 
court's executive committee, to assign the matter to a particu­
lar judge.33 The defendant claimed that this procedure vio­
lated his due process rights, but the executive committee dis­
agreed.34 The judges explained that due process does not give 
a party "the right to determine the manner in which his case 
is assigned to a judge.,,35 Assignment rules promulgated by 
district courts pursuant to the governing federal statutes are 
designed "to promote efficiency . . . and the court has a large 
measure of discretion in applying them."36 
The Keane court's characterization of the defendant's 
claim might not have been entirely accurate. He was not as­
serting a constitutional right to "determine the manner in 
which his case [should be] assigned"; rather, he argued that 
he had a constitutional right to random assignment.37 Sever­
al circuit courts have explicitly rejected such an argument.38 
One of those rulings cites Keane for this proposition,39 which 
seems to be a fair reading of the logic if not the language of 
that decision. 
Not all courts have rejected due process claims out of 
hand, however. A prominent example is Tyson v. Trigg;O a 
3. Keane, 375 F. Supp. at 1205. 

32 [d. at 1203. 

33 [d. at 1203-04. 

3' [d. at 1204-05. 

3' [d. at 1204. 

3. [d. at 1204-05. The court also rejected the defendant's claim that he was 
constitutionally entitled to a hearing on the chief judge's determination that his 
case promised to be "protracted, difficult and widely publicized.n [d. at 1205. 
37 [d. at 1204-05. 
3. See, e.g., Sinito v. United States, 750 F.2d 512, 515 (6th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Simmons, 476 F.2d 33, 35 (9th Cir. 1973). Accord People v. Hattery, 539 
N.E.2d 368, 379-80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). One state court has characterized such a 
due process claim as "frivolous.n Dancer v. State, 715 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 n.l 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1986). 
•• Sinito, 750 F .2d at 515 . 
• 0 50 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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case involving the former heavyweight boxing champion who 
served several years in prison following a rape conviction and 
has had other legal difficulties.41 Mike Tyson argued that the 
method for assigning the trial judge in his Indiana rape trial 
effectively allowed the prosecutor to choose the judge, which 
violated his due process rights.42 Under that system, a prose­
cutor who sought an indictment could choose the grand jury 
before which to present evidence.43 Because each judge in the 
criminal division supervised only one grand jury and presided 
at all trials resulting from that grand jury's indictments, the 
prosecutor's selection of a specific grand jury effectively 
amounted to choosing the trial judge." Chief Judge Posner of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
recognized that, despite the general assumption that judges 
are impartial, a litigant who can choose her judge "may be 
able to obtain a subtle advantage over the other.,,45 Never­
theless, he rejected Tyson's claim, in part due to the procedur­
al rigors of habeas corpus law46 and in part for lack of evi­
dence that the prosecutor actually selected a particular grand 
jury to get the trial assigned to a particular judge:7 
Some state courts also have expressed a measure of sym­
pathy for constitutional arguments in this context. For exam­
ple, a Florida appellate court suggested that a policy that 
eliminated random assignment in about half of a trial court's 
criminal cases might be unconstitutional,4s but ultimately in-
U See Brian Mooar & Fern Shen, Two Motorists May File Charges Against 
Tyson After Md. Crash, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1998, at A8 (summarizing Tyson's 
various legal problems) . 
• 2 Tyson, 50 F.3d at 438 . 
.. Id. 
•• Id. at 438-39 . 
•• Id. at 439. Judge Posner also noted that, partly due to criticism of the 
procedure in the wake of Tyson's trial, the state adopted a new procedure that 
prevents a prosecutor from effectively dictating judicial assignments in criminal 
cases. Id. 
•• Id. at 439-40. 
., Id. at 441-42. 
•• State ex rel. Zuberi v. Brinker, 323 So. 2d 623, 625 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1975) (implying that assignment system that treats some criminal cases different­
ly than others violates equal protection guarantees). 
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validated that policy because it was adopted in violation of 
applicable state procedural requirements.49 The Louisiana 
Supreme Court went even further in State v. Simpson ,50 
holding that due process requires that felony cases be as­
signed randomly or under an alternative mechanism that pre­
vents the prosecutor from controlling judicial assignments.51 
Although the Simpson court did not explain the details of the 
assignment system that it found unconstitutional, the trial 
court apparently gave the prosecutor's office the power to 
determine which judge would hear each criminal case, and 
that the prosecutor intentionally used that power to select its 
preferred judges in many instances. Meanwhile, the same trial 
court randomly assigned all civil cases. 52 
The evidence that the prosecutor deliberately sought to 
use the power to match cases with preferred judges makes 
Simpson a much stronger case for finding a due process vio­
lation than Tyson. Under the circumstances, it is not surpris­
ing that the Simpson court called for random assignment or 
something substantially equivalent. However, the difficulties 
of enforcing the right have undermined the vitality of any 
such constitutional rule. Courts have required a litigant to 
show prejudice from a non-random or otherwise improper 
judicial assignment.53 Even in post-Simpson Louisiana, the 
courts have rejected numerous claims on harmless error 
grounds because the aggrieved party could not show how the 
defective assignment prejudiced the case.54 
Judicial reluctance to endorse a constitutional right to 
random assignment might reflect the difficulty of implement­
ing a sweeping general rule. First, cases are not equivalent. 
" Brinker, 323 So. 2d at 625-26. The new policy was not submitted to the 
state supreme court for approval as required by applicable rules. [d. 
•• 551 So. 2d 1303 (La. 1984) (per curiam). 
" Simpson, 551 So. 2d at 1304. 
52 State v. Romero, 552 So. 2d 45, 47-48 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (describing 
prosecutor's approach to judicial selection in same trial court as that in Simpson). 
03 See, e.g., Sinito v. United States, 750 F.2d 512, 515 (6th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Simmons, 476 F.2d 33, 35 (9th Cir. 1973) . 
•• See, e.g., State v. Huls, 676 So. 2d 160, 167 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Romero, 
552 So. 2d at 49. 
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Some are easy and some are hard. Some will go to trial, while 
most will not (and of those that do not go to trial, some will 
settle, whereas others will terminate by a ruling on a disposi­
tive motion). Some will attract widespread public attention, 
but the vast majority will proceed in obscurity. Because "[a] 
case is not a standard measurement,"55 it is inappropriate to 
require completely random assignment. Second, some cases 
are related-by issue or parties-to other cases. Assigning re­
lated cases to the same judge or panel often makes sense on 
efficiency grounds. Third, some difficult or sensitive cases 
might be better handled by more experienced judges. Fourth, 
judges sometimes recuse themselves from cases in which they 
have a conflict of interest or their impartiality might be called 
into question. Fifth, some cases appear in a court more than 
once. This phenomenon occurs, for instance, when a reviewing 
court remands a case with instructions for further proceed­
ings. Often, although not necessarily in every case, returning 
the matter to the same judge or panel that heard it before 
conserves judicial resources. 
These are not insurmountable difficulties, but they might 
be viewed mainly as administrative challenges that do not 
implicate due process concerns. 56 At least the judiciary seems 
to think so. Therefore, reliance upon constitutional arguments 
as a basis for random assignment seems an unpromising 
strategy. Courts are generally skeptical of such arguments. 
Even those courts that have been rhetorically sensitive to such 
claims have required proponents to meet high evidentiary 
standards. 57 Instead, the law relating to judicial assignments 
so RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 64 
(1996). 
,. A useful illustration comes from the Fifth Circuit. Faced with widespread 
recusals that made it difficult to assign energy regulation cases to regular panels, 
for more than two decades the court has had a special panel that hears such 
cases. A new panel is drawn each year from the pool of judges who are not dis­
qualified. Its members are selected randomly from the pool. See generally DAVID 
E. PIERCE & JONATHAN L. ENTIN, EVALUATING THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPACT OF THE 
SPECIAL OIL AND GAS PANEL OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH 
CIRCUIT (Federal Judicial Center working paper, 1993). 
57 See Sinito, 750 F .2d at 515; Huis, 676 So. 2d at 167. 
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has arisen primarily from "the professional standards of the 
bench and bar,,,58 particularly from court policies and rules. 
II. OTHER APPROACHES TO JUDICIAL AsSIGNMENT 
A. Assignment Rules and Policies 
In addition to the flexibility of judicial assignment appar­
ently afforded by the Constitution, federal law does not man­
date any particular approach to judicial assignment. AF, previ­
ously discussed, the statutes governing the courts of appeals 
and the district courts leave that process to those tribunals. 59 
Neither the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure nor the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure address this subject. 
At the circuit level, only one court, the Ninth Circuit, has 
adopted rules generally calling for random assignment.6o The 
Ninth Circuit also has promulgated rules calling for random 
assignment in certain complex cases.61 A few other appellate 
courts have adopted policies that generally provide for random 
assignment. 62 Those circuits that have no explicit rule or poli­
cy appear to assign cases more or less randomly.s3 In allocat­
ing cases to panels, all circuits take account of the complexity 
of the case and other factors that make it unrealistic to treat 
every filed appeal as equally demanding of judicial time and 
energy. 
Many multi-member district courts have adopted explicit 
rules or policies generally calling for random assignment of 
cases.54 Those systems frequently contain express exceptions 
•• Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1797 (1997) . 
•• See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. 
60 See 9TH CIR. R. Introduction § E(2). 
61 [d. R. 22-1(b), 22-3(b) (death penalty); R. 35-3 (limited en banc rehearings 
involving chief judge and ten other randomly selected judges) . 
•• See 3D CIR. INT. OP. PROC. 1.1; 4TH CIR. INT. OP. PROC. 34.1; 6TH CIR. INT. 
OP. PROC. 19.1-19.2. 
.. See, e.g., 7TH CIR. INT. OP. PROC. 6(b) (noting that in successive appeal, 
original panel may opt to decide subsequent appeal or "return the case for reas­
signment at random"). Some circuits also make a specific provision for random as­
signments in attorney discipline cases. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 46(g)(B); 10TH CIR. R. 
ADD. III, § 4.3 . 
•• See, e.g., M.D. ALA. R. 40.1; D. ARIZ. R. 1.2(c); S.D. CAL. R. 40.1(a); S.D. 
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or authorize departures from strictly random assignment to 
promote efficiency. 55 A similar pattern appears at the state 
level. Court rules generally govern assignment and typically 
involve some form of random procedure, subject to efficiency 
or practicability exceptions.66 Statutory provisions on this 
topic are unusual, but they also embody a preference for ran­
domness.67 
B. Enforcing Assignment Rules and Policies 
Challenges to arbitrary judicial assignments must sur­
mount both procedural and substantive hurdles. On the proce­
dural side, there are questions of timing and reviewability. On 
the substantive side, the challenger usually must show that 
some prejudice resulted from the irregular assignment. 
1. Procedural Issues 
A party who believes that a court has improperly assigned 
a judge to the case can challenge the assignment at the outset 
of the proceedings.68 If this fails, it is not clear whether an 
interlocutory appeal or an action in mandamus or prohibition 
will lie. Although one court has granted a writ of mandamus 
compelling reassignment before trial,69 others have refused 
relief because the challenged action is either discretionary or 
reviewable on direct appeal from a final judgment on the mer-
FLA. R. 3.4(A); S.D.N.Y. R. 1; E.D. WIS. R. 4.01-4.02 . 
•• See, e.g., D. COLO. R. 40.1(A); D.D.C. R. 403; N.D. ILL. R. 2.00; N.D. OHIO 
R. 57.9. 
•• See, e.g., CAL. CT. APP. 1ST DIST. INT. OP. PROC. 21(a), 26; ILL. APP. CT. 
1ST DIST. R. 2(e); MICH. CT. R. 8. 111(B); N.Y. CT. R. 200. l1(b), (e), 202.3(b), (e); 
OHIO SUP. CT. R. 36(B)(1)(e). One state court declares that it does not make as­
signments "on a random or arbitrary basis," but does not explain how it does 
handle this task. OR. CT. APP. INT. PRAC. Introduction n.* . 
.., See, e.g., LA. CODE CIV. ?ROC. ANN. art. 253.1 (West Supp. 1998); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-2a-2(2) (1986) . 
•s See, e.g., Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1100 (lOth Cir. 1972); 
United States v. Keane, 375 F. Supp. 1201 (N.D. Ill. 1974), affd in part and 
rev'd in part on other grounds, 522 F .2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975); People v. Bell, 659 
N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 1997) . 
• 9 Margold v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 858 P.2d 33 (Nev. 1993). 
1998] JUDICIAL ASSIGNMENT AND THE RULE OF LAW 381 

2. Substantive Issues 
On at least two occasions, federal courts of appeals have 
overturned judicial assignments in situations of apparent 
overreaching by chief judges in multi-member federal district 
courts. The relevant statute leaves judicial assignments in 
such courts to local rules, with the chief judge retaining re­
sponsibility for their proper implementation.71 In Utah-Idaho 
Sugar Co. v. Ritter,72 the Tenth Circuit issued a writ of man­
damus to overturn a chief judge's reassignment of a case that 
should have gone to one of his colleagues.73 More recently, in 
In re McBryde,74 the Fifth Circuit set aside another chief 
judge's assertion of authority over cases that had been on one 
of his colleagues' docket.75 Both cases arose in highly unusual 
circumstances. 
Ritter was part of a long-running judicial feud in the Unit­
ed States District Court for the District of Utah. Because the 
two judges of that court were unable to agree on the allocation 
of business, the Tenth Circuit judicial council imposed its own 
assignment system (essentially a random scheme in most 
respects).76 When the second judge took senior status almost 
fifteen years later, the chief judge reassigned some cases on 
70 Coastal Oil N.Y., Inc. v. Newton, 660 N.Y.S.2d 428 (App. Div. 1997); State 
ex ret. Berger v. McMonagle, 451 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1983). 
71 The statute provides for division of business among district judges: 
The business of a court having more than one judge shall be di­
vided among the judges as provided by the rules and orders of the 
court. 
The chief judge of the district court shall be responsible for the 
observance of such rules and orders, and shall divide the business and 
assign the cases so far as such rules and orders do not otherwise pre­
scribe. 
28 U.S.C. § 137 (1994). 
n 461 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1972). 
73 Ritter, 461 F.2d at 1104. 
" 117 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 1997). 
" McBryde, 117 F.3d at 230. 
76 Ritter, 461 F.2d at 1102. 
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that judge's docket to himself rather than leaving them for the 
replacement judge, who was sworn in on the day his predeces­
sor went senior.77 The Tenth Circuit held the chief judge's 
actions void because the relevant statute precluded unilateral 
assignments by the chief judge, and because the circuit judi­
cial council's assignment order remained in force despite 
changes in the composition of the district court.78 
McBryde arose in somewhat less contentious circumstanc­
es, but there is reason to suspect the existence of a difficult 
personal relationship between the judges involved. The chief 
judge reassigned himself two cases that had been on the other 
judge's docket after controversy arose about the first judge's 
handling of those cases.79 In one case, the judge had held an 
assistant United States attorney in contempt for her conduct 
in a criminal case.so In the other case, the judge harshly criti­
cized the clerk of the court for failing to invest the settlement 
proceeds in a wrongful death action in an interest-bearing 
account, a failure that apparently cost the decedent's minor 
daughter a substantial amount of money.81 According to the 
court of appeals, the facts suggested that the chief judge took 
over the cases because he disagreed with the other judge's 
handling of those matters.82 Although the chief judge has 
broad administrative authority to "reassign cases in situations 
involving the recusal, death, disability, or new appointment of 
a judge,"83 the Fifth Circuit reasoned that allowing reassign­
ment motivated only by disapproval of another judge's actions 
is "antithetical to and incompatible with the structure of the 
federal judicial system.,,84 
77 [d. 
78 [d. at 1103-04. 
7. McBryde, 117 F.3d at 208. 
8. [d. at 212-13. 

81 [d. at 214-15 . 

• 2 [d. at 228-29. 

83 [d. at 225 . 

.. [d. Before reaching its conclusion on the merits, the court of appeals had to 

grapple with some difficult jurisdictional questions. The major problem was that 
the Fifth Circuit's judicial council had previously approved the chief judge's ac­
tions. [d. at 217. The effect of that approval, the panel's appellate jurisdiction 
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It is understandable that reviewing courts would inter­
vene to ameliorate the effects of interpersonal judicial con­
flicts. But courts otherwise have been decidedly reluctant to 
overturn assignments, even when they disapprove of the way 
a case was assigned.85 Moreover, courts have tended to defer 
to decisions to bypass the customary assignment system for 
matters that might be related to other cases in the same 
court, for dispositions on remand, or for other successive pro­
ceedings in the same case.86 
Judicial reluctance to intercede in assignments is reflected 
in the widespread requirement that a litigant establish preju­
dice from any improper judicial assignment. Mere departure 
from a random assignment procedure is insufficient to over­
turn a decision.87 The standard explanation for the prejudice 
requirement is that assignment rules are essentially "internal 
housekeeping rules" designed to promote judicial efficiency, so 
courts have wide discretion in this field. 88 
For example, a court may adopt a random assignment 
plan that makes only some of its members eligible for selec­
over the council's order. and the council's authority to issue the order received 
extensive attention in the opinion. [d. at 219-21. 226-30. The difficulty of the 
question of jurisdiction over the judicial council's order may be indicated by the 
fact that the other two members of the panel declined to join that part of the 
opinion. which those judges viewed as unnecessary to resolution of the case. [d. 
at 231 (Garza. J., specially concurring); id. (Dennis. J., specially concurring). 
In the most recent chapter of this controversy. the Fifth Circuit has ordered 
Judge McBryde to recuse himself from two unrelated criminal cases because de­
fense counsel in those cases had testified against him in the judicial council pro­
ceedings. See United States v. Anderson. No. 97-11205, 1998 WL 781240 (5th Cir. 
1998); United States v. Avilez-Reyes, No. 97-11392, 1998 WL 781243 (5th Cir. 
1998) . 
•• See. e.g., United States v. Osum. 943 F.2d 1394 (5th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352, 1355 n.2 (9th Cir. 1985); Okereke v. Kane. 470 
N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (App. Div. 1983). 
86 See, e.g., Osum. 943 F.2d at 1398. 
81 See, e.g., id. at 1399-400; United States v. Gray. 876 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th 
Cir. 1989); United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373. 1385 (9th Cir. 1980); In re 
Marriage of Kenik. 536 N.E.2d 982, 985 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). 
88 Sinito v. United States, 750 F.2d 512. 515 (6th Cir. 1984). See, e.g., Osum. 
943 F.2d 1394. 1400-01 n.3 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Torbert, 496 F.2d 
154, 157 (9th Cir. 1974); Kruckenberg v. Powell. 422 So. 2d 994. 996 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1982); Blair v. Mackoff. 672 N.E.2d 895. 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
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tion in certain classes of cases.89 Also, courts may assign cas­
es involving the same or similar issues outside the customary 
assignment process,90 although such assignment is not re­
quired. 91 One problem with this is that reasonable persons 
can disagree as to what constitutes a "related" case.92 Simi­
larly, a court does not have to reassign a case following a 
mistrial93 or on remand from a higher court.94 After some re­
mands, however, reassignment is ordered.95 Whether reas­
signment on remand is required depends on the extent to 
which the original judge could be expected "to have substan­
tial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously­
expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous;" the 
need "to preserve the appearance of justice;" and a balancing 
of the "waste and duplication" caused by reassignment against 
the benefits gained.96 
.9 Several courts have approved the practice of limiting the pool of eligible 
judges in death penalty cases. See, e.g., People v. Hattery, 539 N.E.2d 368, 380-81 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989); People v. Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457, 469-70 (Sup. Ct. 1997); 
People v. Bell, 659 N.Y.S.2d 713, 715 (Sup. Ct. 1997). C{. United States v. Keane, 
375 F. Supp. 1201, 1205-06 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (upholding plan limiting pool of judg­
es eligible to hear "protracted, difficult or widely publicized" cases), affd in part 
and rev'd in part on other grounds , 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975); see supra notes 
23-27 and accompanying text. 
90 See, e.g. , Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Carefree Travel, Inc., 513 F.2d 375, 
383-84 (2d Cir. 1975); Wayne County Prosecutor v. Parole Bd., 532 N.W.2d 899, 
902-03 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam). C{. Stinchcomb v. State, 383 S.E.2d 
609 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (finding no reversible error in non-random assignment 
based on mistaken belief that case was related to another case assigned to same 
judge) . 
• 1 See, e.g., Tokars v. Superior Ct., 442 S.E.2d 454 (Ga. 1994) (upholding ran­
dom assignment in death penalty case despite local rule favoring assignment of 
co-defendants to same judge). 
92 See, e.g., Morfesis v. Wilk, 525 N.Y.S.2d 599 (App. Div. 1988) (concluding 
unanimously that related cases may be assigned non-randomly, but dividing 3-2 
on whether particular cases were in fact related) . 
• 3 See United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 925 F.2d 604, 608-09 (2d 
Cir. 1991). 
94 See, e.g., Brown v. Baden, 815 F.2d 575, 576 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) . 
•• See, e.g., United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 785 F.2d 777, 781 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (per curiam); United States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 349-50 (9th Cir. 
1982). C{. Ash v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 957 F.2d 432, 435 (7th Cir. 1992) (allow­
ing parties to agree to have case heard on remand by original trial judge despite 
court of appeals' order that case be randomly assigned for further proceedings). 
•• United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam). See also 
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In sum, there seems to be no hard and fast rule requiring 
random assignment of judges to cases. Courts apparently 
enjoy broad latitude in administering their dockets. Although 
challenges to the implementation of assignment plans are not 
as difficult to sustain as are constitutional claims, they pres­
ent formidable hurdles for most litigants. However, none of 
the cases mentioned above involved allegations of bias or par­
tiality against judges. That was what Judge Cameron asserted 
in his attack on The Four. 
III. JUDGE CAMERON REDUX 
If Judge Cameron was correct that the panels in civil 
rights and desegregation cases were manipulated to influence 
substantive decisions, his charges raised profound issues of 
both constitutionality and propriety.97 As explained above, 
there is reason to doubt that assignments were actually made 
for that dubious purpose.98 
But we should not lose signt of a fundamentally important 
fact: some judges-and Cameron was among the most notori­
ous in this respect-simply refuse to accept the legitimacy of 
Brown v. Board of Education99 and other Supreme Court rul­
ings against racial discrimination. loo In particular, 
Alverson, 666 F.2d at 349; United States v. Ferguson, 624 F.2d 81, 83-84 (9th 
Cir. 1980). 
97 Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 438 (7th Cir. 1995); see Marshall, supra note 
14, at 1514. 
" See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text. 
99 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
100 Cameron consistently voted against African-American litigants during his 
tenure on the Fifth Circuit. See Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 208 (5th Cir. 
1963) (Cameron, J., dissenting); Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 322 F.2d 356, 
362 (5th Cir. 1963) (Cameron, J., dissenting); Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 
583, 594 (5th Cir. 1963) (Cameron, J., dissenting), affd, 371 U.S. 37 (1962); Unit­
ed States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 785 (5th Cir. 1961) (Cameron, J., dissenting); 
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961) 
(Cameron, J., dissenting); Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 292 F.2d 4, 4 (5th 
Cir. 1961) (Cameron, J., dissenting); Boson v. Rippy, 275 F.2d 850, 853 (5th Cir. 
1960) (Cameron, J., dissenting); Reddix v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 930, 938 (5th Cir. 
1958) (Cameron, J., dissenting); Sharp v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 
1958) (Cameron, J., dissenting); Avery v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 241 F.2d 
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Cameron's performance in connection with the desegregation 
of the University of Mississippi raises serious questions about 
his fitness to sit in other civil rights cases. In that controver­
sy, a panel of the Fifth Circuit (two of whom were among The 
Four) directed the district judge to order the African-American 
plaintiff, James Meredith, admitted to the University.lol The 
day after the mandate issued, Cameron, who was not a mem­
ber of the panel, issued a stay (to permit the State to file a 
petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, he said).102 The 
panel vacated Cameron's stay, reasoning that it was too late 
to recall the mandate and that the Supreme Court could stay 
the injunction if that were appropriate. 103 The next day, 
Cameron entered another order reinstating his stay.104 The 
panel vacated Cameron's second stay the same day it was 
issued. 105 Three days later, Cameron entered his third 
stay. lOG The panel once more vacated his action. 107 Un­
daunted, Cameron entered his fourth stay two days later. lOB 
After consulting with his colleagues, Justice Black finally 
ended this circus by declaring all of Cameron's orders void and 
refusing to issue a stay of the desegregation order.109 
The Fifth Circuit, largely through the work of The Four, 
sought to overcome defiance, delay, and recalcitrance by way 
230, 235 (5th Cir. 1957) (Cameron, J., dissenting). The only exception located is a 
grudging concurrence in United States v. Atkins, 323 F .2d 733, 745 (5th Cir. 
1963) (Cameron, J., concurring specially in the result). 
101 Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. June 25, 1962). 
102 Meredith v. Fair, 7 Race ReI. L. Rep. 741 (5th Cir. July 18, 1962) 
(Cameron, J.). 
103 Meredith v. Fair, 306 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. July 27, 1962). 
1.,. Meredith v. Fair, 7 Race ReI. L. Rep. 742 (5th Cir. July 28, 1962) 
(Cameron, J.). 
105 Meredith v. Fair, No. 19475 (5th Cir. July 28, 1962) (unreported). 
106 Meredith v. Fair, 7 Race ReI. L. Rep. 743 (5th Cir. July 31, 1962) 
(Cameron, J.). 
107 Meredith v. Fair, 7 Race ReI. L. Rep. 743 (5th Cir. Aug. 4, 1962) (per cu­
riam). 
108 Meredith v. Fair, 7 Race ReI. L. Rep. 744 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 1962) (Cameron, 
J.). 
109 Meredith v. Fair, 83 S. Ct. 10 (Sept. 10, 1962). 
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of procedural and doctrinal innovations. 110 Commentators 
have lionized their efforts in this regard. III At the same 
time, those efforts have prompted some sympathetic lawyers 
and scholars to raise questions about the wisdom and desir­
ability of some of their innovations.1l2 Devising a method to 
exclude the Camerons of the world from hearing cases in 
which they plainly would not follow the law is easy to justi­
fy.1l3 It is more difficult to swallow an effort to marginalize 
cautious or hesitant judges.1l4 However, that does not seem 
to be what happened in the Fifth Circuit. The most that can 
be said about Cameron's charges is that they were not 
proven. 115 
110 See READ & MCGoUGH, supra note 6, at 272-73. 
111 See generally BASS, supra note 6. 
112 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 14, at 1512, 1514. 
113 Cameron's indefensible conduct might explain why the Fifth Circuit never 
adopted a policy of hearing desegregation cases en bane, as the Fourth Circuit 
did. See Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on 
u.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1672 (1998). Cameron would have 
been eligible to sit in en bane proceedings. Although some members of the Fourth 
Circuit were exceedingly cautious in civil rights cases, none was as recalcitrant as 
he was. See Jonathan L. Entin, The Confirmation Process and the Quality of 
Political Debate, 11 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 407, 412-14 (1993) (discussing civil 
rights record of Judge Clement Haynsworth, whose nomination to Supreme Court 
was defeated partIy on this basis). 
114 There is one last question to consider, a question that goes beyond the 
intricacies of legal doctrine: how much difference did the judiciary make in deseg­
regation? This is a large and difficult subject that has generated a substantial 
literature. The basic facts are now well known. During the first decade after 
Brown, when almost the only sustained federal implementation activities were 
those of the district courts and the courts of appeals, public school desegregation 
in the Deep South was negligible. See, e.g., J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LoNELY 
MEN (1961). The situation changed dramatically when the executive and legisla­
tive branches took a larger role. The passage of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, which prohibited federal funding of racially discriminatory programs, and 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which made available un­
precedented amounts of federal school assistance, promoted substantial desegre­
gation within a few years. See GARY ORFIEW, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH­
ERN EDUCATION (1969); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 47-54 (1991). 
Similarly, the adoption of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provided powerful lever­
age against discriminatory practices that had effectively excluded African Ameri­
cans from the political process and led to the registration of millions of new vot­
ers. See, e.g., STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS 329-52 (1976); RoSENBERG, 
supra, at 59-63. 
'" This is not to say that Cameron's charges have been forgotten. One judge 
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IV. JUDICIAL PEREMPrORIES AND RANDOM AsSIGNMENT 
Cameron raised disturbing questions in a highly sensitive 
context. Those questions implicate important general features 
of our judicial system. At this more general level, the difficulty 
of successfully challenging non-random judicial assignments 
reflects the difficulty of proving anything more than a symbol­
ic or procedural injury. We should not exaggerate the impor­
tance of a judge's identity or personal characteristics,116 but 
a party who has a favorable judge "may be able to obtain a 
subtle advantage over the . . . [adversary because the judge 
could be] more likely to resolve close questions in that party's 
favor."1l7 
Some states have embodied that intuition in statutes and 
policies that effectively allow litigants to exercise a limited 
form of peremptory challenge against a judge assigned to their 
case. These measures go beyond for-cause disqualification 
statutes that require a showing of bias or an appearance of 
impropriety.ll8 Rather, they demand, at most, the timely fil­
ing of a good-faith request for substitution of a judge while 
strictly limiting the number of such requests. 119 
Moreover, although federal law currently does not provide 
who joined the Fifth Circuit long after that episode referred to it in an interview 
about the court's special panel for energy regulation cases. See generally PIERCE 
& ENTIN, supra note 56. 
116 See Gregory C. Sisk et ai., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: 
An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998). 
117 Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 439 (7th Cir. 1995). 
118 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 (1994). 
119 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.022 (Michie 1996); 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. 
ANN. § 5/2-1001 (West 1992); ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/114-5 (West 1992); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 35-36-5-1 (West 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-804 (1997); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 38-3-9 (Michie Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-15-21 (Michie 
Supp. 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.58 (West 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.20 
(West Supp. 1997). For a comprehensive discussion of these and other statutes, 
and of judicial rulings and commentary, see State V . Holmes, 315 N.W.2d 703, 
705-26 (Wis. 1982); see also Hornaday V. Rowland, 674 P.2d 1333, 1341-44 (Alas­
ka 1983); People ex reI. Baricevic v. Wharton, 556 N.E.2d 253, 255-61 (Ill. 1990); 
People V. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 890, 891-97 (Ill. 1988); Traynor v. Leclerc, 561 
N.W.2d 644, 647-50 (N.D. 1997); State ex rei. Ray Wells, Inc. V. Hargreaves, 761 
P .2d 1306, 1306-10 (Or. 1988). 
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for peremptory challenges of judges, such a procedure has its 
advocates . For example, the original version of the proposed 
Judicial Reform Act of 1997 contained language authorizing 
parties to federal civil actions to obtain one substitution of 
judge as a matter of right. 120 
Although these devices for peremptory challenges against 
judges are not available in most states or in federal court, and 
are strictly limited in those jurisdictions that permit them, 
their very existence implies an ambivalence about random 
assignment of judges. This ambivalence resembles our difficul­
ty in thinking clearly about race- and gender-based perempto­
ry challenges of prospective jurors: at one level we want to be­
lieve that race and gender are irrelevant to juror decision­
making, but at another level we recognize that these factors 
can make a difference. 121 As long as we remain ambivalent 
about how much a particular judge matters, our legal system 
will not require a strictly random assignment ofjudges. At the 
same time, it will properly condemn deliberate efforts to influ­
ence case outcomes, however subtly, by manipulating judicial 
assignments. 
120 H.R. 1252, 105th Cong., § 4 (1997). 
121 For a sophisticated analysis of these issues, see Eric L. Muller, Solving the 
Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 
106 YALE L.J . 93 (1996). 
